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THE BOARD’S DUTY TO MOITOR RISK AFTER
CITIGROUP
Robert T. Miller*
Across the ideological spectrum, from Paul Krugman1 to Richard
Posner2 and from Lucien Bebchuk3 to Stephen Bainbridge,4 commentators
agree that one of the main causes of the financial crisis was that banks took
on too much risk.5 Not surprisingly, therefore, there are many proposals to
prevent such excessive risk-taking in the future. The Securities and
Exchange Commission has already promulgated new rules requiring all
public companies to provide greater disclosure about their risk oversight
practices, including information about the board’s role in managing risk.6
Senator Schumer has introduced a bill that would require all public
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1. See Paul Krugman, Reform or Bust, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009, at 23 (arguing that
the compensation packages of bank executives encouraged “excessive risk-taking”).
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 106-115 (2009) (analyzing the underlying causes for the recent
recession).
3. Lucien A. Bebchuk and Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247, 247 (2009) (arguing that “banks’ compensation structures have produced incentives for
excessive risk-taking”).
4. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 IOWA
J. CORP. L. 967, 970 (2009) (arguing that “[r]isk management failures during the financial
crisis took several different forms”).
5. I myself have some doubts. See Robert T. Miller, Morals in a Market Bubble, U.
DAYTON L. REV. (2010) (forthcoming) (arguing that when banks took on more risk in the
years leading up the crisis, their decisions were commercially rational given the abnormally
low interest rates set by the Federal Reserve).
6. Amendments to Rules Requiring Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Release
Nos. 33-9089, 34-61175, IC-29092, 17 C.F.R. 229, 239, 240, 274 (Feb. 28, 2010). See also
NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, § 303A.07(b)(i)(D) (2010) (mandating that listed
companies have an audit committee charged with, among other things, “discuss[ing]
policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management”).
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companies to establish board committees to supervise enterprise-wide risk
management practices.7 More recently, President Obama has proposed
prohibiting banks with insured deposits from trading securities for their
own account.8
Perhaps most comprehensively, Senator Dodd has
introduced a bill consolidating various financial regulatory agencies and
creating others, including a new Financial Services Oversight Council that
would, among other things, “monitor the financial services marketplace to
identify potential threats to the stability of the United States’ financial
system.”9
Others have suggested that an important way to limit corporate risktaking lies in stricter enforcement by the courts of the board’s duty to
monitor the company’s exposure to risk.10 Although hardly agreeing with
the wisdom of such ideas, Martin Lipton has written that “the risk oversight
function of the board of directors . . . has taken center stage . . . and
expectations for board engagement with risk are at all-time highs.”11 At
least initially, relying on the oversight or monitoring duties of corporate
boards may seem like a plausible way for society to control corporate risktaking. For, under Delaware law, the board’s authority to manage the
business and affairs of the corporation12 implies a fiduciary duty to monitor
the activities of the corporation,13 which could easily be thought to include
7. U.S. Sen. Schumer Unveils Shareholder Bill of Rights, REUTERS, May 19, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE54I4PF20090519. The text of the bill itself
can be found at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1074&tab=related. For
criticism of the bill, see Martin Lipton, et al., Schumer’s Shareholder Bill Misses the Mark,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 12, 2009, at A15.
8. Text of Obama Statement on Limiting Bank Risk-Taking, REUTERS, Jan. 21, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USN2120707120100121.
9. Proposed Financial Services Oversight Council Act of 2009, § 102(c)(1)(B),
available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titleI.pdf
(last visited Apr. 7, 2010); see generally, Karey Wutkowski, Senator Dodd’s Super Bank
Cop
Faces
Tough
Battle,
REUTERS,
Nov.
11,
2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A94T520091111 (last visited June 16, 2010)
(describing the opposition that the super cop bill faces from the banking industry, certain
regulators, and certain members of the House of Representatives). For President Obama’s
criticism of some aspects of Senator Dodd’s proposals, see Michael R. Crittenden and Corey
Boles, White House Backs Fed Oversight Role, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2009, at A2.
10. Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 970. See e.g., Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor
(Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 281, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1521488 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) (examining
Delaware case law that defines the scope and application of the duty to monitor and
considering whether boards should be held responsible for monitoring business risks).
11. Martin Lipton et al., Risk Management and the Board of Directors, The Harvard
Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Dec. 17, 2009),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/12/17/risk-management-and-the-board-ofdirectors-2/#more-5811 (last visited June 16, 2010).
12. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1953).
13. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968-99 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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the company’s exposure to risk. For example, if the corporation is taking
on excessive risk through the decisions of its traders or other junior
employees, and if the board of directors fails to discover and prevent this
excessive risk-taking, with the result that the corporation suffers losses
when the risks materialize, then perhaps the directors have breached their
fiduciary duties to monitor the corporation and could, in some
circumstances, be liable.14
This theory of oversight liability underlies the plaintiffs’ principal
claim in In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholders Derivative Litigation,15 which
was decided by the Delaware Court of Chancery (Chancellor Chandler)
early last year. In that case, shareholders of Citigroup sued some of the
bank’s current and former directors, alleging that they “breached their
fiduciary duties by failing to properly monitor and manage the risks the
Company faced from problems in the subprime lending market,”16 which
resulted in Citigroup’s overexposure to such risks17 and subsequent severe
losses when the subprime market collapsed.18 Chancellor Chandler had
little trouble ruling for the defendant directors on their motion to dismiss,19
14. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 978 (2009) (describing the recent Citigroup
decision and how it illustrates how plaintiffs will adapt Caremark claims in cases of risk
management failure); Pan, supra note 10, at 27-28 (arguing that “[t]he management of risk
is a corporate governance problem” and courts should “expand[] the scope and application
of the duty [to monitor] in future cases”).
15. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
16. Id. at 111.
17. Id. at 121.
18. See id. at 113 (detailing billions of dollars in losses Citigroup suffered from its
exposure to subprime debt).
19. More accurately, Chancellor Chandler granted the defendant directors’ motion to
dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 for failure to plead demand futility. Id. at 140.
There is a subtlety here not relevant to the primary concerns of the text. In particular, in a
derivative action, shareholder-plaintiffs must either (a) make a pre-suit demand on the board
presenting their allegations and requesting that the board bring suit, and, if the directors
refuse, show that they wrongfully refused to do so, or else (b) plead facts showing that
demand upon the board would have been futile. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362,
366-367 (Del. 2006). If plaintiffs plead demand futility, the complaint must plead with
particularity facts showing that a demand would have been futile. Court of Chancery Rule
23.1; Stone, 911 A.2d at 367 n.9. When the underlying claim is one of oversight liability,
the plaintiff must allege particularized facts that create a reasonable doubt whether the board
of directors “could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business
judgment in response to the demand.” Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-934 (Del.
1993). This means that the plaintiffs must properly plead either that a majority of the board
was interested or lacked independence (which the plaintiffs in Citigroup did not allege) or
else plead particularized facts showing that board’s conduct was “so egregious on its face
that board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment, and a substantial likelihood
of director liability therefore exists.” Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 121 (quoting Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984)). The upshot of all this is that, to survive a motion to
dismiss, the plaintiffs in Citigroup had to plead with particularity facts that, if true, would
show that the Citigroup board faced a substantial threat of oversight liability. Id. at 121. As
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a result that naturally led to some academic criticism.20 Professor Pan, for
instance, has written that it “seems fantastic that the duty to monitor . . .
incentivizes boards to take no responsibility for the business results of the
company—a complete disregard for the principle that the corporation
should be managed by or under the direction of the board,”21 and he has
urged Delaware judges to “begin speaking out about the importance of a
board’s duty to monitor and to back up their exhortations by expanding the
scope and application of the duty in future cases.”22
In this brief article, I want to make one main point about proposals to
expand director oversight liability to police the problem of excessive risktaking by financial institutions—namely, that they are entirely
impracticable. Such proposals may seem to involve only relatively minor
tinkering with Delaware law, but to have any meaningful effect on the
outcome of cases, they would have to effect changes tantamount to
repealing the business judgment rule. Merely as a practical matter, the
Delaware courts and the Delaware General Assembly are not going to
implement such changes. I happen to agree with that result, but I am not
going to defend it here. Instead, my purpose is to describe how radical
proposed expansions of director oversight liability really are.
I.

DIRECTOR OVERSIGHT LIABILITY UNDER CAREMARK AND STO.E

Suits alleging that a board failed to properly monitor the business of
the corporation are generally known as Caremark claims after the
eponymous case decided by then-Chancellor Allen in the Delaware Court
of Chancery in 1996.23 More recently confirmed by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Stone v. Ritter,24 the current doctrine is that, in order to prevail on
Chancellor Chandler notes, this standard is more stringent than the standard for failing to
state a claim under Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), and thus if a complaint survives a motion to
dismiss under Rule 23.1, it will also survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at
139.
20. For example, referring to the case, Professor Alces says that “the board could easily
be considered asleep at the switch when corporate catastrophe occurs to their apparent
surprise.” Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 IOWA J. CORP. L.
239, 252 (2009).
21. Pan, supra note 10, at 26. Simply as a matter of logic, at worst Citigroup gives
boards no incentive to monitor risk; it does not give boards “incentives . . . to take no
responsibility” for such matters, which is a quite different thing. Id. A legal rule may fail to
encourage certain conduct without thereby discouraging it.
22. Pan, supra note 10, at 28.
23. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
24. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). There is a debate of questionable importance as to
whether Caremark included in its definition of oversight liability the scienter element
clearly articulated in Stone. In adopting the scienter element, the Delaware Supreme Court
expressly said that it was merely confirming the holding in Caremark. Id. at 370 (“We hold
that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director oversight
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a claim that the board breached its duty to monitor the corporation, a
plaintiff must prove that either (a) “the directors utterly failed to implement
any reporting or information system or controls” to monitor the business, or
else (b) “having implemented such a system or controls, [the directors]
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling
themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
attention.”25 In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court made it clear that “[i]n
either case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors
knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations,” that is,
that they were “demonstrating a conscious disregard for their
responsibilities.”26 Oversight liability therefore has a scienter element.27
Thus, to prevail, plaintiffs must prove not only that the directors breached
their duty of care but also that they knew they were breaching that duty
when they breached it.
Historically, Caremark claims have virtually always concerned
illegality or fraud by officers or employees of the corporation. That is,
such claims alleged that the board failed to detect and prevent criminal or
fraudulent conduct by corporate employees that ultimately resulted in
losses for the corporation, especially criminal fines or civil penalties or

liability.”). Similarly, Vice Chancellor Strine had, by the time of Stone, been advocating
this understanding of Caremark for some time. See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492,
506 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Although the Caremark decision is rightly seen as a prod towards the
greater exercise of care by directors in monitoring their corporation’s compliance with legal
standards, by its plain and intentional terms, the opinion articulates a standard for liability
for failures of oversight that requires a showing that the directors breached their duty of
loyalty by failing to attend to their duties in good faith. Put otherwise, the decision premises
liability on a showing that the directors were conscious of the fact that they were not doing
their jobs.”). By contrast, Professor Bainbridge thinks that “the content of [the original
Caremark] standard changed significantly” because “[t]he fiduciary duty at issue in the
original Caremark opinion demonstrably was the duty of care” but Vice Chancellor Strine’s
reading of Caremark “ripped the Caremark claim from its original home in the duty of care
and reinvented it as a duty of loyalty.” Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 974-975; see also Peter
D. Bordonaro, Comment, Good Faith: Set In Stone?, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1119, 1126 (2008)
(arguing that Vice Chancellor Strine’s opinion in Guttman “effectively transformed director
oversight liability from a duty of care claim into a duty of loyalty claim.”); Pan, supra note
10, at 17 (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court reinterpreted Caremark, a case originally
decided by Chancellor Allen as [being] about the duty of care, to rather be about the duty of
good faith.”). For the reasons given infra note 59, I think the Delaware Supreme Court and
Vice Chancellor Strine have the better of the argument here.
25. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
26. Id. at 370 (both emphases added).
27. See generally, Jennifer Arlen, Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark and Stone: The
Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor, in J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., CORPORATE LAW STORIES
323-346 (2009) (discussing the changing understanding of the duty to monitor); Hillary A.
Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004) (arguing for an
understanding of good faith based on the scienter requirement of certain provisions of the
federal securities laws).
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settlements. In Caremark itself, for example, junior employees of the
company had caused the corporation to enter into transactions that violated
the federal Anti-Referral Payments Law (one of the statutes governing
Medicare and Medicaid), thus subjecting the corporation to criminal and
civil liability.28 Similarly, in Stone, employees of the defendant bank had
caused the bank to violate the federal Bank Secrecy Act and various antimoney-laundering regulations.29
Other oversight claims have been
premised on the board’s supposed failure to detect and prevent lesser
though still intentional forms of wrongdoing in the corporation. Thus, in
Guttman v. Huang, the plaintiffs alleged that the directors failed to prevent
accounting irregularities that caused the corporation to have to restate its
financial statements for certain fiscal periods, perhaps subjecting the
corporation to liability under the federal securities laws,30 and in ATR-Kim
Eng Financial Corp. v. Araneta, the plaintiffs alleged that the directors had
failed to prevent an officer and controlling shareholder from effectively
looting the corporation.31
II.

IN RE CITIGROUP INC. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION

The oversight claim in Citigroup, however, was premised on a
supposed failure by the board to detect and prevent not illegality or fraud
by corporate employees but merely excessively risky business decisions by
such employees.32 This theory was a somewhat novel application of
Caremark.33 Indeed, Chancellor Chandler’s opinion in Citigroup is not
entirely clear on the issue of whether oversight liability can even be
premised on such claims. On the one hand, he writes that although “it may
be tempting to say that directors have the same duties to monitor and
oversee business risk” as they do “to intervene and prevent frauds and other
wrongdoing that could expose the company to risk of loss,” nevertheless
“imposing Caremark-type duties on directors to monitor business risk is
fundamentally different” because doing so “would involve courts in

28. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961-65.
29. Stone, 911 A.2d at 365.
30. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 493.
31. No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006).
32. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123 (noting that plaintiffs’ Caremark claims were based on
defendants’ alleged failure to monitor the company’s business risks).
33. See id. (stating that the “[p]laintiffs’ theory of how the director defendants will face
personal liability is a bit of a twist on the traditional Caremark claim” because “[i]n a
typical Caremark case, plaintiffs argue that the defendants are liable for damages that arise
from a failure to properly monitor or oversee employee misconduct or violations of law,”
but in the instant case “plaintiffs’ Caremark claims are based on defendants’ alleged failure
to properly monitor Citigroup’s business risk, specifically its exposure to the subprime
mortgage market.”).
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conducting hindsight evaluations of decisions at the heart of the business
judgment of directors,”34 which Chancellor Chandler is obviously (and
correctly) loathe to do. He thus concludes, “Oversight duties under
Delaware law are not designed to subject directors . . . to personal liability
for failure to predict the future and to properly evaluate business risk.”35
This makes it sound as if Caremark claims founded on alleged failures by
the board to monitor the company’s business risk are barred as a matter of
law, and this is indeed how some scholars, such as Professor Pan, read the
decision.36
On the other hand, elsewhere in his Citigroup opinion, Chancellor
Chandler seems to leave open the possibility that, in an appropriate case, a
board might be subject to liability under Caremark for failing to monitor
the corporation’s business risks. Noting that “plaintiffs allege that the
defendants are liable for failing to properly monitor the risk” that the
company was taking on, and concluding that the “plaintiffs in this case
have failed to state a Caremark claim,” Chancellor Chandler nevertheless
stated that “it may be possible for a plaintiff to meet the burden under some
set of facts.”37 This, to be sure, sounds as if Caremark claims can, at least
as a matter of law, be premised on a failure by the board to properly
monitor the business risks borne by the company, even if in practice such
claims are even less likely to succeed than Caremark claims premised on a
board’s failure to detect and prevent illegality or fraud. Although the
matter is not free from doubt, I think this is the correct reading of the
opinion because, to reach the result he does, Chancellor Chandler in fact
performs a standard Caremark analysis. That is, he does not simply
dismiss the suit by noting that the plaintiffs have alleged a failure by the
board to oversee the company’s business risk rather than its compliance
with law. Rather, he actually applies the doctrine from Caremark and
Stone to the plaintiffs’ factual allegations—a procedure that would be
superfluous unless oversight liability may lie for failures to monitor such
risk.
Moreover, the application of Caremark and Stone principles to the
allegations in Citigroup turns out to be quite straightforward. First,
34. Id. at 131.
35. Id.
36. Professor Pan writes that “Chancellor Chandler rejected the plaintiffs’ claims on
two grounds,” one of which was that “a board cannot be held liable for failure to monitor
business risk.” Pan, supra note 10, at 25.
37. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126 (both emphases added). Professor Bainbridge,
considering the matter at length, concludes that although risk management, on the one hand,
and legal compliance and accounting controls, on the other, do “not differ in kind,”
nevertheless they do “differ . . . in degree,” and “Caremark claims thus appropriately lie
with respect to each,” even if “courts need to be especially sensitive in applying Caremark
to the former class of cases.” Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 981, 985.
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Chancellor Chandler quickly noted that the plaintiffs “do not contest that
Citigroup had procedures and controls in place that were designed to
monitor risk,” including an audit and risk management committee of the
board of directors that met regularly and was charged with monitoring the
credit, market, liquidity, and operational risk exposures of the bank.38
Hence, the plaintiffs could not prevail on a theory that the “directors utterly
failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls”39 to
monitor business risks.40 Second, although the plaintiffs argued that the
director defendants “did not make a good faith effort to comply with the
established oversight procedures,”41 nevertheless as Chancellor Chandler
said, “to establish director oversight liability, plaintiffs would ultimately
have to prove bad faith conduct by the director defendants” and thus had to
plead “particularized factual allegations that raise a reasonable doubt that
the director defendants acted in good faith”—that is, that they consciously
disregarded their duties.42 The plaintiffs, however, failed to plead any
particularized facts tending to show that the directors knew that they were
not properly monitoring the company’s risk. Although Chancellor
Chandler never puts it this way, the plaintiffs simply did not plead facts
tending to show scienter, and so their complaint failed to state a claim
under Caremark and Stone.
As I noted above, this result has occasioned some academic criticism.
Is there a practicable way to apply or, if need be, modify Caremark and
Stone “to define director duties with respect to risk assessment”43 and “to
define the types of information that ought to be reported to the board in
order to fulfill its oversight function,”44 as Professor Brown would have it?
Likewise, is there a way to “expand the scope and application of the duty
[to monitor] in future cases,”45 as Professor Pan would have it? In other
words, is there some change in the law that would have allowed the
plaintiffs in Citigroup to prevail or, at least, to have survived a motion to
dismiss and get to trial? The fact that Professors Brown and Pan are so
vague here as to what changes they might like to see in the law is telling,
38. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 127.
39. Stone, 911 A.2d 362 at 370.
40. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 127.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 128.
43. Posting by J. Robert Brown to TheRacetotheBottom.org, Delaware Courts and
Exonerating the Board from Supervising Risk: In re Citigroup Derivative Litigation
(Introduction), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/delawarecourts-and-exonerating-the-board-from-supervising-r-4.html (Mar. 12, 2009, 09:00 AM).
44. Posting by J. Robert Brown to TheRacetotheBottom.org, Delaware’s Top Five
Worst
Shareholder
Decisions
for
2009
(#2):
In
re
Citigroup,
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/delawares-top-five-worstshareholder-decisions-for-2009-2-in.html (Jan. 6, 2010, 06:00 AM).
45. Pan, supra note 10, at 28.
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for the answers to all these questions are in the negative. No changes in the
doctrines governing oversight liability are likely to affect the outcomes of
real world cases unless we are also prepared to completely repeal the
business judgment rule.
III. WHAT EXPANDING DIRECTOR OVERSIGHT CLAIMS WOULD ENTAIL
The reason for this is somewhat complex and is best explained in three
stages. First, regardless of what the standard of care may be in oversight
cases, regardless of what the law says boards ought to do to monitor risk,
and regardless of whatever other changes would-be reformers desire, it is
next to impossible for plaintiffs to prevail in Caremark suits because they
have to prove scienter—that is, they have to prove not just that the board
failed to properly monitor the business (however this duty may be
understood) but also that the board knew that it was failing to do so. In
whatever cases in which would-be reformers think the directors should be
liable for failing to monitor the business, even if the directors were being
negligent or grossly negligent, often the directors did not in fact know that
they were failing in their duties. In those cases where the directors actually
did know this, proving this is, in the nature of the case, extremely difficult.
Absent the proverbial telltale email or evidence collected by wiretaps
(which is obviously not available in civil cases), proving that the
defendants had a certain state of mind is next to impossible. Hence, the
scienter requirement in Caremark is a powerful, almost insuperable, barrier
to using oversight liability to hold boards responsible for monitoring risk.
Second, even if the scienter requirement were eliminated from
Caremark, the claims plaintiffs might then bring would sound only in the
duty of care, and in that case they would be immediately dismissible,
provided only that the corporation had an exculpatory Section 102(b)(7)
provision in its certificate of incorporation. Section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law authorizes Delaware corporations to
include in their certificates of incorporation provisions eliminating the
personal liability of directors for breaches of their duty of care (but not for,
among other things, breaches of their duty of loyalty or actions not taken in
good faith).46 The Delaware General Assembly enacted this provision47 to
46. More precisely, Section 102(b)(7) provides that a Delaware corporation’s certificate
of incorporation may contain “[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a
director: (i) [f]or any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under §174 of [the Delaware General
Corporation Law]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit.” 8 Del. Code § 102(b)(7) (2009).
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quell the crisis caused by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith
v. Van Gorkom,48 and nowadays all well-advised Delaware corporations—
and thus virtually all public companies incorporated in Delaware—have
such provisions in their certificates. When a suit seeking monetary
damages (and not equitable relief) against the directors alleges only a
breach of the duty of care, it is dismissible once the defendant directors
properly invoke the Section 102(b)(7) provision in the corporation’s
charter.49
Put another way, Section 102(b)(7) provisions block suits for
monetary damages against boards for breaches of the duty of care, whether
for their active business decisions or for their failures in monitoring or
overseeing the business. No matter what the judge-made law concerning
the duty to monitor or oversee may be, suits against public companies
(which virtually always have Section 102(b)(7) provisions) sounding in
oversight liability will be dismissible if they fail to allege bad faith—i.e., a
knowing breach of duty. Currently, these suits are dismissible because
Caremark and Stone make scienter an element of an oversight claim. If the
Delaware Supreme Court reversed this holding and allowed oversight
claims based solely on the negligence or gross negligence of the board,
such suits would still be dismissible, but then the reason would be that the
board was exculpated from liability for such suits under the corporation’s
Section 102(b)(7) provision. Any meaningful change in director oversight
liability in Delaware, therefore, would require repealing or significantly
abridging Section 102(b)(7).
Strangely, this fact seems to have been overlooked by Citigroup’s
critics. Thus, Professor Brown mentions that the plaintiffs in Citigroup
alleged that the defendant directors consciously disregarded their duties and
explains that such an allegation is “made necessary by the ubiquitous
presence of waiver of liability provisions,”50 but he never averts to the fact
47. 65 Del. Laws c. 289 (1986).
48. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding directors personally
liable for breaching their duty of care in approving merger of the corporation). For the nowstandard criticisms of the opinion, see Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and
the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437 (1985) (criticizing the holding in Van Gorkom).
See generally E. Norman Veasey, et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged
Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399 (1987)
(discussing various provisions of Delaware law protecting directors from personal liability).
All of the states (but not the District of Columbia) have enacted provisions that are more-orless analogous to Section 102(b)(7). See MARK A. SARGENT & DENIS R. HONABACH, D & O
LIABILITY HANDBOOK (2009) (citing and discussing the laws of various states).
49. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093 (Del. 2001) (holding that a complaint
that unambiguously and solely asserts only a duty of care claim is dismissible once the
corporation’s Section 102(b)(7) provision is invoked).
50. Posting of J. Robert Brown to TheRacetotheBottom.org, AIG, the Delaware Model,
and the US Government, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-
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that these provisions also make the expansion of director oversight liability
he advocates quite pointless. Similarly, Professor Pan mentions Section
102(b)(7) often, but he seems to overlook its significance here. He writes
that the Delaware courts had “limit[ed] . . . the duty to monitor” as
originally articulated in Caremark, “first, by equating the duty to monitor
with the duty of good faith” and then “second, by subsuming the duty of
good faith into the duty of loyalty” in a manner such that a breach of the
duty would require scienter.51 “The re-categorization of the duty to monitor
as part of the duty of loyalty,” he says, “removed monitoring failures from
Section 102(b)(7) exculpation, but it also made it more difficult to show
that directors breached their duty to monitor.”52 This, I think, gets things
rather backwards. It is not as if including a scienter element first did
plaintiffs a favor by “removing [their oversight suits] from 102(b)(7)
exculpation” but then made their cases harder to win by requiring that they
prove scienter. Rather, in the presence of Section 102(b)(7) provisions,
duty to monitor claims sounding solely in the duty of care were always
going to lose. They could lose because they were exculpated under Section
102(b)(7) provisions, or they could lose because scienter was an element of
oversight claims, but one way or another, they would lose. When Stone
held that scienter was an element of oversight claims, all it really did was
grant directors at the trivial number of corporations lacking Section
102(b)(7) provisions the same protection against oversight duty-of-care
claims that directors at most corporations already had.
Others have carried this misunderstanding to significant heights.
Thus, the authors of one law review article have worried that the “effect of
[Stone’s] recasting Caremark as a loyalty claim [by including a scienter
element in such claims] is to expose directors to a much higher level of
oversight liability” because “[i]f oversight liability cases . . . are framed
under the duty of loyalty instead of the duty of care, section 102(b)(7) is
essentially irrelevant in these cases.”53 Stone did indeed make Section
102(b)(7) provisions irrelevant in oversight suits, but not by depriving
boards of their protection and thus exposing boards to oversight claims that
might have been barred by such provisions. Rather, Stone made Section
102(b)(7) provisions irrelevant in oversight cases by barring at the outset
oversight suits that would eventually have been blocked by such provisions
anyway. Saying that Stone exposed directors to more liability rather than
less because it made scienter an element of oversight liability
law/aig-the-delaware-model-and-the-us-government.html (Mar. 31, 2009, 09:00 AM).
51. Pan, supra note 10, at 13.
52. Id.
53. Andrew D. Appleby and Matthew D. Montaigne, Three’s Company: Stone v. Ritter
and the Improper Characterization of Good Faith in the Fiduciary Duty “Triad,” 62 ARK.
L. REV. 431, 457 (2009).
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fundamentally misunderstands the situation.
Such confusions aside, the main point is that because virtually all
public companies have Section 102(b)(7) provisions, oversight claims
sounding merely in negligence and not alleging scienter were always going
to fail, and any judicial expansion of the oversight duty-of-care is therefore
quite pointless. It will not affect how cases are ultimately decided: the
oversight duty of care can be as demanding as one likes, but since directors
are exculpated from breaches of it, directors will always win when
shareholders sue them for breaching the duty. Effectively expanding
oversight liability would require excepting oversight duty-of-care claims
from Section 102(b)(7) exculpation. Absent a herculean effort of judicial
re-interpretation of that statutory provision, this would require action by the
Delaware General Assembly, which is extremely unlikely to be
forthcoming.
This settles the issue as a practical matter, for even if the Delaware
Supreme Court overruled Stone to eliminate scienter as an element of
oversight liability, it is very difficult to imagine the Delaware General
Assembly abridging the protections of Section 102(b)(7). It is even more
difficult to imagine the Delaware courts willfully misinterpreting that
statute to accomplish the same result and still more difficult to imagine the
Delaware courts so doing and the General Assembly not immediately
acting to make it clear that Section 102(b)(7) extends to oversight claims
not involving bad faith. Expanding director oversight liability, therefore, is
simply a non-starter in practical terms.
Third, it is instructive to go further, and suppose per impossibilem that
not only did the Delaware courts eliminate the scienter requirement from
oversight claims but also that oversight claims based merely on breaches of
the duty of care came somehow to be excepted from the scope of Section
102(b)(7) exculpation provisions. Director oversight suits based solely on
alleged breaches of the duty of care could then at least reach trial. It is
worth understanding, I think, that allowing such claims would stand
Delaware’s business judgment jurisprudence on its head.
Courts have always been more reluctant to find directors liable for
their failures to monitor the business than for their own actively taken
business decisions. Thus, as far back as Caremark, Chancellor Allen
famously wrote that oversight liability “is possibly the most difficult theory
in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”54
There are many reasons for this, but perhaps the most important is that, as
Chancellor Allen went on to explain in Caremark, in reviewing duty-ofcare claims concerning active business decisions by the board, Delaware
courts consider not the content of the decision (that is, whether the decision
54. In re Caremark Int’l. Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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was on the merits right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable, prudent or
foolish, etc.) but only the process of decision-making leading up to the
decision55 (that is, whether the directors considered all the material
information reasonably available56 and made an honest judgment as to what
was in the best interest of the company).57 In an oversight claim, the
allegedly wrongful conduct is not a decision by the board and not even a
decision to do nothing; it is, rather, mere inaction, or, as Chancellor Allen
put it, “an unconsidered failure of the board to act.”58 Since there is no
decision at issue in an oversight claim, there is no procedure leading up to
that decision for the court to review. A wholly different standard must
therefore apply. If that standard includes no scienter requirement but is a
merely objective standard such as negligence or even gross negligence,59
55. Id. at 967-968; see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (stating
that “substantive due care . . . [is] a concept . . . foreign to the business judgment rule,” for
courts “do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments” and “do not even decide if
[such decisions] are reasonable,” and so in the business judgment context, “[d]ue care in the
decisionmaking context is process due care only”). I agree with Judge Easterbrook and
Professor Fischel’s view that there is no ultimate difference between (a) a court’s reviewing
the procedure leading up to a business decision, and (b) a court’s reviewing the decision
itself, for the decision of which information to gather before deciding is itself a business
decision. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 107-108 (1991) (“Judicial inquiry into the amount of information
managers should acquire before deciding creates the precise difficulties that the business
judgment rule is designed to avoid. Information is necessary for corporate managers to
maximize the value of the firm. But there is a limit to how much managers should know
before making a decision . . . . Information is costly, and investors want managers to spend
on knowledge only to the point where an additional dollar generates that much in better
decisions.”). At this point, however, the distinction between so-called substantive due care
and procedural due care is, however, well engrained in Delaware’s business judgment
jurisprudence. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1440-1441 (discussing costs of gathering information before
making a business decision).
56. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
57. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating that the business
judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company”).
58. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (emphasis omitted). I discuss this important difference
between decisions actively made and unconsidered failures to act at length in Robert T.
Miller, Wrongful Omissions by Corporate Directors: Stone v. Ritter and Adapting the
Process Model of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 911
(2008).
59. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing whether the original
Caremark decision included a scienter requirement). In my view, I think there can be little
doubt that the original Caremark decision contemplated scienter as an element of oversight
liability. Given Chancellor Allen’s well-known view that the holding in Smith v. Van
Gorkom was ill-advised, see William T. Allen, et al., Van Gorkom and the Corporate
Board: Problem, Solution, or Placebo?, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 458 (2002) (advocating a
standard of review of director business decisions under which liability would require “a
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then implementing it would require a court to determine what the board
should have known, that is, what kind of information and reporting system
it should have designed and implemented. Hence, the court would have to
review the content of the board’s decisions creating and implementing the
system. If the point of such a system is to maximize value for the
shareholders, however, then the key issue in designing such a system is
whether the benefits of the system in the form of improved decisionmaking by the board exceed the costs of designing and implementing it.60
As Chancellor Allen put it, “the level of detail that is appropriate for such
an information system is a question of business judgment,”61 and all the
reasons that underlie the business judgment rule’s effective prohibition on
courts’ reviewing the content of business decisions would apply as much to
this decision as to any other. In other words, if courts are to review
oversight claims other than under a standard involving scienter, they are
inevitably involved in reviewing some of the board’s business judgments
on the merits.
Not everyone has fully appreciated this point. Thus, in criticizing
Citigroup, Professor Brown says that, if “the board considered relative
risks and made a decision to go forward, the decision almost certainly
would have fallen under the business judgment rule and almost certainly
would have been insulated from liability”—a result of which Professor
Brown presumably approves.62 Nevertheless, he faults the Citigroup
‘devil-may-care’ attitude or indifference to duty amounting to recklessness”), it is difficult
to believe that he would hold that a purely objective standard applied to board omissions in
oversight cases. Moreover, the language of Caremark is, in all pertinent passages, couched
in terms of good faith, which tends to imply a scienter requirement. See Caremark, 698
A.2d at 971 (“Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is predicated
upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation . . . in my opinion only
a sustained or systematic failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting
system exists will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.
Such a test of liability—lack of good faith as evidence by sustained or systematic failure of
a director to exercise reasonable oversight—is quite high.”).
60. See Robert T. Miller, Wrongful Omissions by Corporate Directors: Stone v. Ritter
and Adapting the Process Model of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 10 U. PA. J.
BUS. & EMP. L. 911, 939-940 (2008) (arguing that “whether an information and reporting
system is reasonable is itself a substantive business decision” because “assuming that a
reasonable system is one that maximizes shareholder value in the long run, a system will be
reasonable if the benefits of the system, in the form of improved decision-making by the
board, exceed the costs of designing and implementing it” and “[m]easuring these costs and
benefits and balancing the one against the other is exactly the kind of highly uncertain
judgment at issue in business decisions”).
61. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
62. Posting of J. Robert Brown to TheRacetotheBottom.org, Delaware’s Top Five
Worst
Shareholder
Decisions
for
2009
(#2):
In
re
Citigroup,
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/delawares-top-five-worstshareholder-decisions-for-2009-2-in.html (Jan. 6, 2010, 06:00 AM). But perhaps Professor
Brown, whose evaluation of Delaware’s business judgment jurisprudence is not entirely
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decision for failing “to define the types of information that ought to be
reported to the board in order for it to fulfill its oversight function,”63
apparently not realizing that this determination is just as much a business
decision as any other. Similarly, Professor Pan agrees that it “is not for the
court to decide”64 “whether the [Citigroup] board exercised good business
judgment,”65 but he nevertheless thinks that Chancellor Chandler has “an
overly-narrow interpretation of the duty to monitor”66 and should
“strengthen[] the fiduciary duty to monitor”67 to ensure that “boards . . .
make the effort to collect the right type of information about the
corporation.”68 It cannot be both ways. A duty of care applicable in
oversight cases necessarily involves substantive review of some of a
board’s business decisions. If we are to have duty-of-care oversight claims,
we give up on the fundamental tenet of the Delaware business judgment
rule. This is presumably not what critics of Citigroup intend to
accomplish.
IV. CONCLUSION
The upshot, therefore, is that any significant expansion of oversight
liability would involve three things: (a) deleting the scienter requirement of
oversight claims articulated in Stone in order to allow oversight suits
sounding only in the duty of care (that is, as negligence or gross negligence
claims); (b) amending or judicially re-writing Section 102(b)(7) to make
exculpation provisions adopted thereunder inapplicable to such duty-ofcare oversight claims; and (c) worst of all, significantly abridging the
cardinal principle of Delaware business judgment jurisprudence that courts
will not review on the merits the substantive content of business judgments
of the board. Although many people, including such friends of Caremark
as Martin Lipton, have worried that Caremark will not survive the financial

favorable (he opines that “Delaware cannot be trusted to define fiduciary obligations for
directors”), may question even this.
See Posting of J. Robert Brown to
TheRacetotheBottom.org, Delaware Courts and Exonerating the Board from Supervising
Risk: In re Citigroup Derivative Litigation, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemptionof-delaware-law/delaware-courts-and-exonerating-the-board-from-supervising-r-4.html
(Mar. 12, 2009, 09:00 AM) (criticizing the Citigroup decision).
63. Posting of J. Robert Brown to TheRacetotheBottom.org, Delaware’s Top Five
Worst
Shareholder
Decisions
for
2009
(#2):
In
re
Citigroup,
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/delawares-top-five-worstshareholder-decisions-for-2009-2-in.html (Jan. 6, 2010, 06:00 AM).
64. Pan, supra note 10, at 26.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 27.
68. Id.
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crisis,69 in reality not one of the three things necessary to expand director
oversight liability is actually likely to happen, and the third in particular
would throw Delaware business judgment jurisprudence into the deepest
confusion. I would oppose any of these possible changes in Delaware law,
but there may be people in the world who think all of them are good ideas.
Such people should be clear, however, both with themselves and with
others, just how extreme their views really are.

69. See Posting of Dimitra Kessenides to The Am Law Daily, The Am Law Litigation
Daily: November 13, 2008, Securities: Marty Lipton: Caremark Standards May No Longer
Be Good Enough, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/11/the-am-law-li-7.html
(Nov. 13, 2008, 09:00 AM) (“I have grave doubts that the Caremark standard is going to
survive the financial crisis.”).

